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N HER RECENT PAPER “(WHITE) TYRANNY and the Democratic 
Value of Distrust,” Meena Krishnamurthy argues that distrust has a po-
litical value that has often been overlooked by democratic theorists. 1 
Pursuant to making this argument, Krishnamurthy first offers an account of 
distrust based on the work of Martin Luther King Jr., and then argues for the 
democratic value of this conception of distrust. These two tasks are crucially 
related: Krishnamurthy’s aim is not to engage in general conceptual analysis 
about distrust, but to show that the particular account of distrust that she 
presents is politically useful (392). For the purposes of this discussion, I 
would like to grant that distrust can be politically useful, which Krishna-
murthy convincingly demonstrates through her examination of King and the 
Black Civil Rights Movement. Rather, in the spirit of Krishnamurthy’s meth-
odological approach, I will raise a few questions about whether the particular 
account of distrust that Krishnamurthy develops from King is in fact best 
positioned to capture distrust’s political value. Moreover, I will argue that an 
alternative account of distrust might reveal distrust’s noninstrumental politi-
cal value, in contrast with the merely instrumental role it is granted by Krish-
namurthy. 
The centrality of belief is the most significant difference between the ac-
counts of trust and distrust that Krishnamurthy develops from King and 
some of those elsewhere in the philosophical literature on (dis)trust. As 
Krishnamurthy puts it, on King’s view, “distrust is the confident belief that 
another individual or group of individuals or an institution will not act justly 
or as justice requires”(391). Though distrust is the primary focus of the essay, 
Krishnamurthy also offers a preliminary take on King’s account of trust: “To 
trust someone, on King’s view, was to believe that they would not only act 
justly but also that they would act justly for the right reasons” (395). 
In what follows, I will briefly state three general questions about the 
prominence given to belief in Krishnamurthy’s discussion, and then draw 
them together by considering how the potential political value of Krishna-
murthy’s account compares with another recent account of distrust provided 
by Katherine Hawley.2 
First, equating trust and distrust with beliefs renders these attitudes 
much less voluntary than they might otherwise be. By comparison, it is the 
sense that we must be able to decide to trust that leads philosophers such as 
Richard Holton to reject that trust requires a particular belief in the trusted 
and what they will do.3 So we might ask whether making distrust less volun-
                                                 
1 Krishnamurthy 2015. Cited in text hereafter. 
2 Hawley 2014. 
3 Holton 2006; Jones 2004. See also Jones 1996. 
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tary (assuming that acquiring beliefs is less voluntary than the adoption of 
other attitudes) has an effect on its political value. Might a more voluntary 
construal sit better with Krishnamurthy’s characterization of distrust in terms 
of “checks and balances” on the abuse of political power? Indeed, if the po-
litical value of distrust consists, as Krishnamurthy argues, in its causal power 
to instigate actions that challenge tyranny (392), we might worry that a non-
voluntary construal of distrust will be relatively inert in comparison with a 
conception that would be responsive to a call to action. 
Second, Krishnamurthy’s account does not explicitly mention some of 
the common affective elements that we find in other theories of (dis)trust, 
such as Holton’s inclusion of the participant stance, or Karen Jones’ sugges-
tion that distrust involves non-reliance plus resentment. Will we completely 
capture distrust’s political value if these affective elements are absent from 
the account itself? Is mere belief sufficient to provide the kind of motivating 
force that makes distrust politically valuable in causing responsive action 
(401)? 
Finally, we might wonder whether Krishnamurthy’s account is suffi-
ciently sensitive to the appropriateness of distrust, as Hawley discusses in her 
recent work on distrust.4 If distrust is just a matter of belief about others act-
ing unjustly, then it may well be misplaced or ill formed (as beliefs are wont 
to be), contributing to the contingent nature of its political value (as Krish-
namurthy acknowledges (401)). 
We can bring these three general questions together by comparing 
Krishnamurthy’s account of trust with Hawley’s recent alternative. According 
to Hawley, “To distrust someone to do something is to believe that she has a 
commitment to doing it, and yet not rely upon her to meet that commit-
ment.”5 Moreover, this account includes the following condition on appro-
priateness: “[I]t is appropriate to trust or distrust someone to do something 
only if that person has an explicit or implicit commitment to doing it.” 6 
While there is still a role for belief in Hawley’s account, distrust is not merely 
a belief. Rather, it hinges on a more voluntary element: to not rely on some-
one to meet the commitment that you believe she has.  
Incorporating the idea of not relying on a commitment can help inject 
distrust with more of the motivating force that makes it politically valuable. 
On Krishnamurthy’s account, it seems that one might have a confident belief 
that an institution is unjust (which is sufficient for distrust on her account), 
and yet rely on it anyway. This kind of distrust thus seems like it might lead 
to a kind of tragic political apathy instead of fomenting political resistance.7 
                                                 
4 Hawley 2014. 
5 Hawley 2014: 10. 
6 Hawley 2014: 9. 
7 Admittedly, it depends on how the belief that the system is unjust is cashed out. It may be 
that one cannot both believe not-X and rely on X (e.g., believe that you will not pick me up 
at the airport and rely on you to do so), in which case Krishnamurthy’s account might have 
non-reliance built in implicitly. However, I take it that the belief in the injustice of a political 
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By comparison, perhaps the decision not to rely on the unjust system, on top 
of the belief that it is unjust, would offer an account of distrust with greater 
political value given its more voluntary nature. Indeed, this alternative might 
also fit well with the causal story that Krishnamurthy offers about distrust in 
the Black Civil Rights Movement. Furthermore, this account gives us the re-
sources to explain why distrust is appropriate (indeed very appropriate) in 
King’s case. The police, the government, White citizens, etc., did have a 
commitment to combat racial injustice and provide equal treatment under the 
law for all citizens, a commitment that King (correctly) believed that they had, 
but did not rely on them to meet. On Hawley’s account, the appropriateness 
of distrust is not just a function of, for example, King having good reasons 
for his confident beliefs about the system and what people will do (as Krish-
namurthy discusses on 394), but is moreover a function of facts about peo-
ple’s commitments, which can help us screen off cases of seeming distrust in 
which such commitments are absent. For example, this would allow one to 
explain why it would not be appropriate for White citizens to distrust fellow 
White citizens who fail to demonstrate race-based partiality on the reasonable 
assumption that there is in fact no commitment to do so. This may allow us 
to sort out the appropriateness of different cases of what Krishnamurthy 
calls “social distrust” (396) based on factors that go beyond the mere beliefs 
of the distrusters. 
Though neither affective attitudes nor the participant stance are explic-
itly built into Hawley’s account, she does note that “attitudes such as resent-
ment are to the fore in situations of distrust.”8 We could make this observa-
tion explicit in the account by adding that distrust involves appropriate re-
sentment toward those on whom we do not rely to meet their commitments. 
Krishnamurthy mentions that distrust sits among other “negative attitudes,” 
such as anger, that have historically been ignored as sources of political value, 
yet her account of distrust seems to lack any explicit affective element. It 
seems plausible that an account of distrust that more explicitly integrated af-
fective elements, such as anger and resentment, into the account itself would 
provide an even more robust vehicle for that political value. The motivation-
al force of emotions could help further explain how distrust could function 
as a catalyst for political action (on top of confident beliefs about injustice). 
Given Krishnamurthy’s broader interest in vindicating the political value of 
negative attitudes, coupled with the role of affective elements in other theo-
ries of (dis)trust, it seems that an explicit affective element would better se-
cure distrust’s political value.  
Putting together Hawley’s account of distrust with an affective element 
yields a view that registers more successfully along the political metrics sug-
gested by Krishnamurthy: Because it is voluntary and affective, it is better 
                                                                                                                         
system is not necessarily incompatible with relying on it (for social services, etc.). Moreover, 
because of the difference between belief and reliance with respect to their voluntariness, I 
think it is helpful to distinguish these elements and make them explicit. 
8 Hawley 2014: 7. 
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poised to motivate political action, and it includes conditions for appropri-
ateness that allow us to differentiate politically worthy forms of distrust from 
those that, though motivationally efficacious, are corrupt (such as racist 
forms of social distrust). Moreover, though, I believe this richer account of 
distrust can help us see how distrust is not merely instrumentally valuable for 
democratic societies, but might rather constitute a core democratic value. If 
distrust has merely instrumental democratic value, especially of the causal 
variety that Krishnamurthy describes, then there is a sense in which it is no 
different from the horrible police brutality that also played an instrumental 
role in fomenting political action during the Black Civil Rights Movement (to 
continue with Krishnamurthy’s example). But, if that is the case, then it is 
perhaps unsurprising that distrust has received little attention from democrat-
ic theorists: All kinds of things causally influence political action and thus 
might be said to have instrumental democratic value. 
In contrast, using Hawley’s account, we can see that distrust may have 
more than just instrumental democratic value. To not rely on others to meet 
their commitments (in particular, when you have good reason to believe that 
they will not meet them) is part and parcel of the participatory nature of 
democratic society. Krishnamurthy notes that distrust can be an extension of 
Madisonian “checks and balances” meant to guard against tyranny. This is an 
outcome-oriented account of distrust’s democratic value, which is part of the 
reason it is contingent: It either helps achieve this end or it does not. Howev-
er, I would suggest that the process of cultivating a healthy distrust, particularly 
of elected representatives, is constitutive of a well-functioning democracy, 
independently of whether or not it happens, in a given instance, to guard 
against tyranny. Indeed, one might think this is the primary value of the free-
dom of the press championed by Madison. Moreover, this need not be in-
compatible with the kind of civic solidarity (or, in Krishnamurthy’s terms, 
horizontal trust) that many democratic theorists believe is essential to a well-
functioning democracy. 
In conclusion, then, I believe Krishnamurthy is correct to emphasize 
the democratic value of distrust. However, I am skeptical that the particular 
account of distrust that Krishnamurthy develops from King is adequate to 
capturing that value, nor the centrality of its place in a democratic society.9 
 
Erich Hatala Matthes 
Wellesley College 
Department of Philosophy 
ematthes@wellesley.edu 
  
                                                 
9 An earlier version of these comments was presented at the 2015 Bellingham Summer Phi-
losophy Conference. Thanks to Meena Krishnamurthy for her thought-provoking paper, to 
Rachel Anne McKinney for discussion and to Kate Manne for the invitation to comment. 
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